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Comment
The Legal Status of Bilingual Education in
America's Public Schools: Testing Ground for a
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation of Equal
Protection
I.

INTRODUCTION

Millions of ethnic minority students attending American public
schools must learn their lessons with the additional hardship of an
English language deficiency. Of the forty-nine million children compelled to attend our nation's schools, approximately five million
speak a principal language other than English.' Congress recognized
the special educational needs of this large number of children by
passing the Bilingual Education Act. 2 Since the Act's passage in
1968, funding for bilingual education programs 3 has been available
to local school districts. A few states have also enacted statutes in
an attempt to ameliorate the hardship of the language barrier.'
Several courts have taken steps towards eradicating the policies
5
of linguistic exclusion in the public schools of the United States.
These courts have acted pursuant to the Supreme Court's 1974 deci1. W. GRANT & C. LIND, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS: 1977-78, 1 (1978); Office of
Education, U.S. Dept. of HEW, Draft: Five Year Plan 1972-77: Bilingual Education Programs, app. B, Aug. 24, 1971. A 1967 study concluded that three out of the five million are
unable to acquire enough proficiency in English to benefit from daily classes. Hearings on
H.R. 9840 and H.R. 10224 Before the Gen. Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1 Sess. 7 (1967) (hereinafter cited as 1967
Hearings). Given the difficulty in determining present estimates, it must be assumed that
these figures represent conservative assesments of the needs of the 1970's. See notes 13 and
14 and accompanying text infra.
2. 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970). However, in five years this Act had reached only about two
percent of the nation's bilingual children. 119 CONG. REC. S18811 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1973).
3. As used in this comment, bilingual programs of education "can mean anything from
ESL (English as a second language) in the first grade to a full range of subjects over six or
more grades." Hearings on H.R. 15 Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and
Vocational Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
178 (1977). Of course, the proper form of bilingual instruction to be implemented depends
upon community circumstances and the extent of the need for bilingual education within the
school system.
4. See notes 63 & 64 and accompanying text infra.
5. See notes 68-113 and accompanying text infra.
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sion in Lau v. Nichols,I which held that linguistic minority students
have a statutory right to effective bilingual instruction. It was necessary to construe Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in this
manner in order to guarantee these students a meaningful education
under the laws. Other courts, however, have interpreted Lau in a
fashion that reduces it to a standard without meaning by. deferring
to local school board policies and programs concerning bilingual
education.7 Therefore, a school board can potentially avoid the
mandates of Lau by implementing ostensible bilingual education
programs and manipulating testing and evaluation procedures.
This comment will review the setting of Lau, the decision itself,
its legislative aftermath, its impact in the desegregation area, as
well as the judicial clash of opinion as to the degree of judicial
intervention necessary to assure the effective enforcement of these
rights. Finally, it will be concluded that a more searching standard
of review is necessary for the purpose of determining liability under
Lau, since the decision itself is capable of a multitude of interpretations concerning the extent of court involvement necessary to vindicate rights in this area. To achieve this more searching approach,
it will be argued, by analogy, that the strict scrutiny standard of
review, used in the constitutional area, should be applied in determining liability under the statutory right established by Lau. This
would compel courts, regardless of their philosophical persuasions,
to intervene in state education policies in order to protect the educational rights of linguistic minorities. Such an active role, however,
could only be undertaken if it could be shown that the effect of the
school board's policies was to discriminate against linguistic minorities, rather than to provide them with a meaningful education pursuant to the dictates of Lau.
H.

PREFACE TO

Lau

Three important factors persuaded the United States Supreme
Court to grant certiorari in. Lau v. Nichols. First was the pressing
need for bilingual education throughout the United States. The
United States Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity conducted a 1972 investigation into the education of mi6. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
7. See Otero v. Mesa County School Bd., 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975) and Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), discussed at notes 114-148 and accompanying text infra.
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nority group children. It concluded that one of the greatest failures
of American public schools occurred among members of language
minorities due to a "conscious or unconscious policy of linguistic
and cultural exclusion and alienation."'8 The existing problems had
been compounded by the fact that many states actually mandated
an English-only approach. Twelve states required English to be the
exclusive language of instruction in their schools.' Five states provided criminal penalties for violation of this requirement.'0 Only two
states required bilingual instruction, and even then only under a
select set of circumstances." Furthermore, Spanish Americans and
American Indians, constituting the largest groups of minorities,
were growing in numbers.' 2 Also, a million children from at least
thirty other ethnic backgrounds were burdened with a serious handicap in communication.' 3 Thus, the urgent need for bilingual education was particularly manifest when the Supreme Court accepted
Lau for review in 1974.
Another factor which weighed heavily upon the Supreme Court's
decision to grant certiorari in Lau was the judicial division over the
constitutionality of English-only instruction. The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits disagreed as to whether bilingual relief should be mandated
8. SELECT SENATE COMM. ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPoRTUNIT,

92D CONG., 2D SESs., RE-

PORT: TOWARDS EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTuNrrY 277 (Comm. Print 1972).
9. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1605 (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-17 (West 1977); IDAHO
CODE § 33-1601 (1963); IND. CODE ANN. § 28-5402 (Burns 1970); IOWA CODE § 280.5 (1949);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 158.080 (1971); MINN. STAT. § 126.07 (1960); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit.
20, § 75-7503 (1947); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
70, § 11-102 (West 1972); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 13-33-11 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
40.46(1) (West 1966).
10. Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, and South Dakota. For appropriate code sections, see note 9 supra.
11. For example, the Massachusetts Transitional Bilingual Education Act mandated that
a school board provide bilingual instruction if 20 or more children within the district were
found to be of limited English-speaking ability. The Act also provided for an annual evaluation of these students to determine their oral comprehension and speaking, reading, and
writing abilities in English. The Act made the provision of bilingual instruction discretionary
on the part of the school board if, through such testing procedures, less than 20 students were
found to be of limited English-speaking ability. Finally, the operative educational standard
under the Act was that the bilingual child must be given special language instruction until
he could perform successfully in English-only classes.
12. See, Comment, The ConstitutionalRight of Bilingual Children to an Equal Educational Opportunity, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 951 (1974) (hereinafter cited as The Constitutional
Right of Bilingual Children).
13. 1967 Hearings, supra note 1, at 7. For an interesting article suggesting that black
Americans have bilingual rights under Lau, see Van Geel, The Right to Be Taught Standard
English: Exploring the Implications of Lau v. Nichols for Black Americans, 25 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 863 (1974).
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in schools where the state had provided a group with the same
instructional program as other children, but the results of such education were unequal. Plaintiffs in Lau v. Nichols were Chinesespeaking children attending public schools in San Francisco.' They
alleged that the failure to provide bilingual instruction to all nonEnglish speaking children deprived them of a meaningful education
in violation of their statutory and constitutional rights of equal
protection. 5 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California concluded, however, that they were only entitled
to the same educational terms and conditions as were available to
all other students in the San Francisco Unified School District." On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint."
Directly contrary to this decision was the Tenth Circuit's holding
in Serna v. PortalesMunicipal Schools."' The action was brought on
behalf of Spanish-speaking children in a New Mexico school district. 9 The district court found that the plaintiffs did not in fact
have equal educational opportunity and that a violation of their
constitutional right to equal protection had occurred. 0 In Serna,
unlike Lau, the district court relied on evidence of disproportionately low I.Q. scores and the poor performance of Spanish surnamed pupils."' The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered that bilingual instruction be provided." From this
order the school district appealed.Y In 1973, while Serna was still
on appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Lau in an attempt to resolve the constitutional issues
represented by the conflicting decisions in these cases.
However, conflicting case law and the drastic need for bilingual
education were not the only concerns of the Court at the time it
accepted Lau for review. There was also the problem of determining
14. 414 U.S. at 564.
15. Id.
16. Order, Lau v. Nichols, Civil No. C-70, 627 LHB (N.D. Cal., May 26, 1970).
17. 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), rehearing en banc denied, 483 F.2d 805, cert. granted,
412 U.S. 938 (1973).
18. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
19. 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972).
20. Id. at 1282.
21. Id. at 1281-82. The state action requirement was satisfied, as this court perceived it,
by the school district's "promulgation and institution of a program . . . which ignores the
needs of. . . [minority] students." Id. at 1283.
22. Id. at 1283.
23. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
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the importance of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with
respect to this type of social litigation.2 4 Although few schools were
receiving federal monies in 1964, by the time Lau was decided in
1974, almost all of the nation's school districts were receiving federal
aid.2 5 This meant that they came under the prohibitions of Title VI
which stated: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in,!
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."26
The potential clout of this statute was exhibited by the fact that
each school district utilizing federal monies had to agree to comply
with Title VI's anti-discrimination provision.Y Given the scope of
this statute, it is understandable that the Supreme Court accepted
Lau for review. The facts of Lau were particularly well suited for
defining the role that this expansive federal statutory right was to
play in the implementation of various federal programs throughout
the United States.2s
III.

THE Lau CASE

In Lau v. Nichols, Chinese public school students instituted an
action against the San Francisco Unified School District.2 .Ofthe
2,856 ethnic Chinese in the school system, only about 1,000 were
given supplemental courses in the English language, while 1,800
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
25. S. LEvrrAN & R. TAGGART, THE PROMISE ov GREATNESS 121-22 (1976).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
27. The act authorized HEW to enforce compliance with any requirement adopted to
carry out Title VI, by termination of fundiRg or other means authorized by law. Such action
was to be taken only after an attempt to secure voluntary compliance had failed. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-1 (1970). In Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court of appeals
held that if voluntary obedience does not follow such an attempt, then HEW is not relieved
from responsibility to enforce the statute and "[a]consistent failure to do so is a dereliction
of duty reviewable in the courts." Id. at 1163. This decision, therefore, allows a private cause
of action for individuals to enforce Title VI and its baggage of regulations.
28. Since Lau, potential Title VI issues have been presented in the following areas: Pabon
v. Levine, 70 F.R.D. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (unemployment compensation); Frontera v. Sindell,
522 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1975) (federally funded unemployment insurance program); Arroyo
v. Tucker, 372 F.Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (voting); Soia v. Oxnard School Dist. Bd. of
Trustees, 386 F. Supp. 539 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (desegregation); Sanchez v. Norton, Civil Action
No. 15732 (D. Conn. June 3, 1974) (welfare).
29. 414 U.S. at 564. This school system had been integrated in 1971 pursuant to a federal
court decree. Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal.
1971). Subsequently, an application for a stay of the decree was denied in Lee v. Johnson,
404 U.S. 1215 (1971).
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received no special instruction. 30 As a result of this program of instruction, plaintiffs sought general relief against resulting unequal
educational opportunities allegedly in violation of their equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment.3 ' No specific remedy was sought, only that the school board be ordered to act in some
fashion to remedy the situation. 32 The district court denied relief;
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no infringement of the equal protection clause
or of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had occurred. 33 The
Court of Appeals reasoned that all students enter their educational
careers with certain assets and liabilities depending upon their social background and upbringing.3 4 Even though some of these are
impediments which may be overcome, but are ignored by the Board,
it does not amount to a "denial" of educational opportunities under
the fourteenth amendment.3 5 Thus, the court concluded that, due
to the complicated nature of remedial language instruction, policy
judgments in this area were best left to the wisdom and discretion
3
of the local school boards.
However, the Supreme Court refused to dismiss the controversy
in such a summary manner. Of particular interest to the Supreme
Court was the importance of the English language in the California
3
educational scheme7.
Fluency in English was a prerequisite to high
school graduation,3 and the use of English as the language of instruction was mandated by the state. 39 In addition to these factors,
school attendance was compulsory for children between the ages of
six and sixteen.4 0 Given these state-imposed standards, the Court
determined that no equality of treatment occurred by merely providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and
curriculum, since "students who do not understand English are
30. 414 U.S. at 564.
31. Id.
32. Id.at 565.
33. Id. The Ninth Circuit had dismissed the Title VI claim in a footnote, assuming that
it was synonymous with the equal protection clause: "Our determination of the merits of the
other claims of appellants will likewise dispose of the claims under the Civil Rights Act of
1964." 483 F.2d at 794, n.6
34. 483 F.2d at 797.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 799-800.
37. 414 U.S. at 565-66.
38. Id. at 566.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education."'" Justice
Douglas, who delivered the opinion of the court, deemed such a
state of educational affairs a "mockery of public education." 4 2 It was
wholly unreasonable and unacceptable to expect all students to
have basic English skills before entering school, when in fact those
basic English skills are at the very core of what the public schools
are supposed to teach. 3
Unlike the two lower courts, which had wrestled with the constitutional issue of equal protection, the Supreme Court followed the
traditional'approach and avoided this issue.4 Plaintiffs' plea was
answered solely on the grounds of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.' 5 Section 602 of the Act authorized the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to issue rules, regulations
and orders to insure compliance with Section 601.46 Pursuant to
these directives, HEW formulated regulations which specified that
school systems receiving federal funds may not provide a benefit to
a person in a different manner from that provided to others in the
system. 7 School boards using federal funds were also precluded
from restricting any person from partaking in the privileges or ad8
vantages that others enjoyed within the school system.'
The regulations seemed broad enough to forbid race and national
origin discrimination of any kind. 4 This was evidenced by the
"effect" language employed by HEW in describing the type of discriminatory activity that was forbidden by the statute ° Clarifying
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. This theory of avoidance of constitutional issues was first posited by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
45. 414 U.S. at 566. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
46. Section 602 provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than
a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section [2000d] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection
with which the action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
47. 414 U.S. at 567. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(1)(ii) (1973).
48. 414 U.S. at 567.
49. Id. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.5(b) (1977).
50. 414 U.S. at 568. A recipient of federal funds is prohibited from utilizing "criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination"
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guidelines to these regulations were issued by HEW in 1970.11 These
guidelines directed local school boards to take affirmative steps towards rectifying language deficiencies in order to open up institutional programs to linguistic minority students." School boards
were also forbidden from developing bilingual education programs
which operated as an educational "dead end" or as a "permanent
track.' 5 3 Under this barrage of HEW regulations and guidelines, the
Court concluded that the statute prohibited discrimination which
has that effect even absent a purposeful design."
Once the Court determined that intentional discrimination was
not a prerequisite to the statutory violation, and that the HEW
guideline required the school board to correct language deficiencies,
the focus of the court's inquiry shifted to whether those directives
promulgated by HEW went beyond the authority of Section 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.11 In order to justify the regulations as
acceptable, non-ultra vires acts, the Court had to interpret the statute broadly. The Act was construed to outlaw not only unequal
treatment, but also equal treatment when the results would be unequal. Absent this effect-oriented approach, the Court could have
concluded that plaintiffs received equal protection under the laws.
This was the approach that the lower courts had taken in Lau when
it was concluded that, since all students had been provided with the
same tangible education, no equal protection violation existed.' 6 If
this were the heart of the statutory command, these regulations
formulated by HEW which proscribe such behavior would be outside the scope of Congress' intended delegation of authority. Therefore, such regulations would have been construed to be without force
and effect. The Court, however, did not reach this result. In light
of prior case law, the regulations were upheld as a reasonable exer57
cise of Congress' intentional delegation of power.
or "has the effect of defeating ... the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a
particular race, color, or national origin." (emphasis added). 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1977).
51. 414 U.S. at 568. See 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595.
52. 414 U.S. at 568.
53. Id.
54. 414 U.S. at 568.
55. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring).
56. See note 16 and accompanying text supra. A narrower reading of the statute would
have meant no violation if all students were provided with the same tangibles of education.
57. Although not directly confronted by the majority opinion, Justice Stewart's concurrence approached the problem in this fashion:
The critical question is, therefore, whether the regulations and guidelines promulgated by HEW go beyond the authority of § 601. Last Term, in Mourning v. Family
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Lastly, Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, expressed
the view that the number of students involved would be determinative of whether a statutory violation had occurred."s He agreed that
the 1,800 deprived Chinese students in this case warranted judicial
concern, but implied that an opposite result would be reached if the
rights of a few children or just a single child were at stake. 9g It was
made clear by Justice Blackmun that under such circumstances he
did not regard the Lau decision as conclusive upon the issue of
whether the statute and the guidelines require the funded school
district to provide special instruction. °
Because the Lau petitioners had only asked that the Board of
Education be directed to apply its expertise to the problem and
rectify the situation, the court did not specifically address the problem of remedy."' As a result, the Supreme Court's decision did not
answer the difficult question of how language discrimination is to
be eliminated vis a vis national origin students with English language problems. The Court simply decided the case on statutory
grounds, reversed the judgment of the lower court, and remanded
62
the case to the district court for the appropriate relief.
IV.

THE LEGACY OF

A.

Lau

Legislation

The impact of Lau was demonstrated by the passage of legislation
concerning bilingual education on the state and federal levels. By
May, 1975, only one year after Lau was decided, the number of
PublicationService, . . . we held that the validity of a regulation promulgated under
a general authorization provision such as § 602 of Tit. VI "will be sustained so long as
it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.'..."I think the
guidelines here fairly meet that test. Moreover, in assessing the purposes of remedial
legislation we have found that departmental regulations and "consistent administrative construction" are "entitled to great weight." ... The Department has reasonably
and consistently interpreted § 601 to require affirmative remedial efforts to give special
attention to linguistically deprived children.
414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 572 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59. Id.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 565. However, even if a specific bilingual program had been requested by
petitioners, the Supreme Court has customarily deferred to the trial courts on the issue of
the specific remedy to be ordered. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
62. 414 U.S. at 569.
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states which mandated bilingual education for linguistic minorities
had grown and almost equalled the number of states which prohibited bilingual instruction in state-operated schools. 3 The terms of
these specific state statutes differ; but the prototype, the meticulous
Massachusetts Transitional Bilingual Education Law," has served
as an example for laws in other states.
On the federal level, Lau seemed to have even more of a farreaching effect. Congress codified the Court's holding in the Equal
Educational Opportunity Act of 1974.11 Consequently, no public
school district in the United States could avoid the mandates of Lau
by declining to apply for federal financial assistance." Thus, the
Lau rule was extended to all public schools, not just those receiving
federal funds as required under Title VI.11 It seemed from this legislation in the wake of Lau that Congress, as well as the Supreme
Court, had embarked on a good faith effort to abolish policies of
linguistic exclusion in the educational system of the United States.
B.

Bilingual Cases

The effects Lau will have on controversies concerned with the
issue of bilingual education cannot be generalized. Any attempt to
appreciate the consequences of Lau must include a review of the
status of the law as it has developed since that pivotal decision. A
case by case analysis of the facts and judicial reasoning in the more
important cases will illuminate the ramifications of Lau in the bilingual education area.
63. As of 1975, 8 states mandated that school boards provide bilingual instruction in one
form or another. Of this number, Pennsylvania was the only state which did this by regulation
rather than statute. On the other hand, 10 states expressly prohibited any type of bilingual
education in all the public schools of the state. The remainder of the 30 or so states either
had no provision for bilingual education or adopted a discretionary approach as to its implementation. 4 H. GEFFER, R. HARPER II, S. SARMIENTO, & D. SCHENBER, PAPERS IN APPLIED
LINGUISTICS: BILINGUAL EDUCATION SERIES 122-23 (May, 1975) (hereinafter cited as GEFFERT &
HARPER). See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra for a comparison to the status of state
law in the pre-Lau era.
64. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71A (West Supp. 1978-79). This and other state statutes
are outlined in Geffert & Harper, supra note 63. The Massachusetts statute is explained more
fully at note 11, supra.
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1703 (Supp. V 1975).
66. Id.
67. This legislation even went so far as to specifically exclude bilingual staffing programs
from the Act's general prohibition against discrimination by local school boards in teacher
hiring and firing practices. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(d) and (f) (Supp. V 1975).
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Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools"

The factual situation in this case was remarkably similar to Lau.
Plaintiffs were Hispanic students placed in totally English-speaking
educational programs." These students were determined to be deficient in the English language, but no affirmative steps had been
taken to remedy their language problems.7" The district court's
memorandum opinion found a violation of the students' constitutional right to an equal educational opportunity under the fourteenth amendment." Rejecting the school board's proposed program
as "tokenism", the lower court ordered the adoption of a bilingual
education program. 2 This more expansive bilingual-bicultural plan
ultimately included portions of program proposals submitted by
both the plaintiffs and the school district.7 3 The Portales School
officials and the state both appealed the decision. While this appeal
was pending, the Supreme Court decided Lau. As a result of the Lau
decision, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's plan for bilingual instruction. This conclusion, however, was based solely on
plaintiff's Title VI claim.75 Thus, the court followed the lead of the
Supreme Court and ignored the constitutional issue.
Also in conformity with Lau, the Tenth Circuit determined that
the effect of the discrimination involved in this case was to deprive
these students of a meaningful education.7 6 These Hispanic students
were effectively prevented from participating in the educational
process in violation of the requisites of Title VI and its enabling
regulations.7 7 However, Serna represents an expansion of Lau in
that the Tenth Circuit was forced to pass on the issue of the adequacy of the remedy.78 In approaching this question, the court con68. 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). The conflict between this decision and Lau v. Nichols,
483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), was one reason the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lau.
See notes 14-23 and accompanying text supra.
69. 499 F.2d at 1153.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1154.
73. Id. As to the combined nature of this program, see Note, Bilingual Education:Serna
v. Municipal Schools, 5 N.M.L. REV. 321, 327 (1974-75).
74. 499 F.2d at 1154.
75. Id. at 1153.
76. Id. at 1154.
77. Id.
78. Plaintiffs in Serna, unlike Lau, had petitioned the court for a specific program of
instruction to rectify the situation. 499 F.2d at 1154. See note 32 and accompanying text
supra.
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cluded that the record reflected a long-standing educational policy
by the Portales schools that ignored the needs of Spanish surnamed
children.7 9 As a result of this perspective, the court not only affirmed
the lower court's determination as to the inadequacy of the School
Board's plan, but also agreed to use segments of plaintiff's bilingual
proposal in fashioning a decree for the appropriate relief.8"
The court justified this judicial intervention into the educational
policy of the school system by referring to the spirit of Swann v.
Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,"'which held.that once
"a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of the district
court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth
and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." 2 However, the
analogy to Swann, a desegregation case, is arguably inapplicable
because of the constitutional dimensions of Swann. Normally, constitutional rights are given greater protection than their statutory
counterparts. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that the broad
equitable powers which may be required to right a constitutional
wrong, as in Swann, would also be required in a Title VI action.
Such inherent remedial powers may be within the "spirit" of
Swann, but could still be considered to be overly broad and excessive given the nonconstitutional nature of the claim, the ambiguity
of Title VI, as well as the general concern of the courts to refrain
from intruding in the educational policy of the local school districts."3 The problem is that the Swann approach would justify such
judicial interference into the educational policies of the local school
districts, even in cases where the right and violation involved are
only nominal in scope. The implication that the existence of a single
bilingual child with English language problems would trigger the
broad equitable powers of the court is perhaps going further than
the Tenth Circuit had intended. This is seen by the fact that subse79. 499 F.2d at 1154. The court found that in spite of the need for bilingual education in
the school system, "appellants neither applied for funds under the federal Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880b nor accepted funds for a similar purpose when they were offered
by the State of New Mexico." Id. at 1149.
80. This is explained in Note, Bilingual Education:Serna v. Municipal Schools, 5 N.M.L.
REv. 321, 327 (1974-75).
81. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
82. 499 F.2d at 1154, quoting from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd.of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971). Swann dealt with the desegregation of a southern school district found liable
for practicing de jure segregation against black minority students.
83. This policy of deference was manifested in Otero v. Mesa County School Bd., 408 F.
Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975) and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975),
which were also Tenth Circuit cases. See notes 114-148 and accompanying text infra.
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quent to Serna, the Tenth Circuit has, in essence, rejected all vestiges of this interventionist approach in favor of the more secure
policy of deference to state educational programs. 4
Finally, Serna expounded upon the problem of the number of
students involved." The New Mexico State Board of Education
suggested that in light of the Swann analogy, the results of the
court's decree would be oppressive in that it would mandate bilingual programs throughout the state wherever any student is found
to be incompetent in the English language." However, the Tenth
Circuit attempted to overcome this inconsistency by adopting Justice Blackmun's requirement that a substantial group of students
be involved in the deprivations before a Title VI violation would
exist. 7
2.

Aspira of New York v. Board of Education of the City of New
York8

In 1972, Puerto Rican and other Hispanic students in New York
City brought an action against the city board of education to compel
the adoption of an effective bilingual program of education." As in
Lau and Serna, the educational policies of the school board were
alleged to violate the equal protection clause, and the right to an
equal educational opportunity mandated by Title VI. ° Again, as in
Lau and Serna, the school board raised, as a defense, that it had
treated all students equally.9 However, before the court could decide the merits of this issue, the lawsuit was truncated by plaintiffs'
motion for summary judgment, which was predicated upon the Supreme Court's decision in Lau.92 As a result of the dictates of Lau,
and with encouragement from the trial court, defendant joined
84. See note 83 supra.
85. This numbers problem was strongly alluded to by Justice Blackmun in his concurring
opinion in Lau. See notes 58-60 and accompanying text supra.
86. 499 F.2d at 1154.
87. Id. This inconsistency will be more fully explored at notes 201 & 202 and accompanying text infra.
88. Although there is no official cite for Aspira since it ended in a consent decree, related
cases may be found in 65 F.R.D. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (attorney's fees); 58 F.R.D. 62 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (motion to dismiss); 423 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (contempt proceeding).
89. 65 F.R.D. at 542.

90.

Id.

91.
92.

58 F.R.D. at 64.
See 423 F. Supp. at 649.
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plaintiffs in formulating a consent decree. 3
The consent decree provided for the most far reaching court sanctioned bilingual program since Lau. The decree called "for methods
of identifying those to receive bilingual instruction, for specific
forms of instruction in Spanish and English, for the formulation of
pertinent educational standards, the preparation and distribution
of instructional materials, the recruitment and training of staff, the
procurement of suitable funding, and continued consultation with
plaintiffs . . . ."I' Although the decree seemed to be superficially
adequate, it lacked any concrete standards for implementation.
However, as a result of the onslaught of a contempt proceeding to
enforce the injunction,95 the decree became more than a mere outline which could be pursued or disregarded as the school board, in
its educational wisdom, saw fit. In this subsequent action, the court,
relying heavily on the "effectiveness" standard, not only found that
the board of education had failed to comply with the duties they
assumed under the consent decree and implementing orders of the
court, but also concluded that the defendant had not employed, in
good faith, the utmost diligence in discharging its responsibilities."
As a result of these determinations, defendant was held in contempt
and ordered to comply with the decree and other related court orders. 7
Aspira goes beyond the Supreme Court's decision in Lau to the
extent that it enables plaintiffs to sue a school board for contempt
and then recover costs of the litigation. In rationalizing these stringent measures, the court declared that "the rights of the people
under the law, when they are duly brought to issue before the court,
must be forthrightly declared and enforced." 9 The significance of
93. See id. For their successful efforts in this regard, plaintiffs were held entitled to
attorney's fees. 65 F.R.D. at 544.
94. See 423 F. Supp. at 649.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 648. As will be seen in Rios v. Reed, 73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), discussed
at notes 99-113 and accompanying text infra, the courts can impose the same standard of
"effectiveness" as was used by the Lau court in determining liability to the problem of
appropriate remedy when a school district is charged with offering an inadequate program
rather than no program at all.
97. 423 F. Supp. at 659-60.
98. Id. at 648. The court then cited Bradley v. Richmond School Board, 416 U.S. 696, 718
(1974), as further justification for compensating plaintiffs for their expenses since "plaintiffs
may be recognized as having rendered substantial service to both the Board itself, by bringing
it into compliance with its constitutional mandate, and to the community at large by securing
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the possibility of a contempt proceeding, in which socially active
plaintiffs can recover their costs, is that school boards will not be
able to continue to whitewash bilingual programs of instruction.
The more sympathetic courts will require clear proof that the school
district is taking affirmative steps towards effectively eliminating
the practice of linguistic exclusion in the particular public school
system under review. This more stringent and searching standard
of review is further portrayed by the implications of Rios v. Reed. 9
3.

Rios v. Reed

In Rios, plaintiffs' class action certification identified the complaining class as language deficient Puerto Rican and Hispanic children attending school in the Patchogue-Medford School District in
Suffolk County, New York. 10 Unlike previous bilingual cases, however, this case revolved around the procedural issue of whether
plaintiffs could compel answers to interrogatories and demand production of other documents from the defendants. 0' Although the
defendant school district had supplied much of the information requested, the names and other identifying characteristics on the test
results, class schedules, and bilingual identification cards were not
delivered to plaintiffs. 0 2.Plaintiffs argued that without this information, the mass of data provided by the defendant was useless, since
it would be impossible to determine which students were language
deficient; whether such students were receiving proper English language instruction; and whether significant numbers of these students persisted in their language deficiencies despite the bilingual
programs offered by the school district.0 3
Defendants objected to the discovery on three grounds, only one
of which concerned an interpretation of Lau.'0, It was argued that
for it the benefits assumed to flow from a non-discriminatory educational system." 423 F.
Supp. at 660.
99. 73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).

100. Id.at 591.
101. Id.at 592.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The other two grounds asserted were (1) that the Family Educational Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.. § 1232g (Supp. IV 1974), prohibited the disclosure of names
or other identifying information of students enrolled in the Patchogue-Medford school system
and (2) that even if the 1974 Act was not a bar to disclosure, compliance with discovery
requests would cause great dissension and unrest and create enormous administrative problems for the school district. Id. at 592-93.
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Lau limited the issue in Rios to whether or not the school district
had taken affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiencies of
alienated non-English speaking students." 5 From this point of view,
it was asserted that since the district had already instituted an
affirmative action program to remedy English language barriers, it
had satisfied its obligations to Hispanic students required by Title
VI and the fourteenth amendment." 6 As a result, defendants argued
that plaintiffs' interrogatories and request for documents were directed purely at discretionary matters of evaluation and remedy.
These are items supposedly within the total purview of the educational agency.'"' Thus, the school board viewed plaintiffs' request to
utilize this information in evaluating the bilingual programs as irrelevant.
The court factually distinguished Rios from Lau by noting that
the defendant school district in Rios had provided some form of
remedial education for the linguistic minority students. "8 Pursuant
to the HEW guidelines that such programs not act as "an educational deadend," the court concluded, however, that not just any
program would satisfy the dictates of Lau. 01 1Lau was read as requiring schools receiving federal funds to develop effective programs.,"
To a non-English speaking child, an inadequate program was found
to be as harmful as no program at all."'
The Rios decision recognizes that the courts are to take a more
active role and not act as mere overseers, as defendants had desired.
The court concluded that any quantitative increase in bilingual
programs due to greater federal expenditures was "meaningless
' 2
without a concomitant emphasis on the quality of instruction.""
Thus, Rios implies that, although Congress may provide the money
for the tangibles of bilingual instruction, it will ultimately be up to
the courts to assure equal educational opportunity for all students
in the United States by seeing that such funds are effectively
spent." 3 Such a decision may go beyond that anticipated by the
105. Id. at 592.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 594.
109. Id. at 595.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 596.
113. To justify this approach the court cited the 1974 Amendments to the Bilingual
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 880b (Supp. IV 1974). 73 F.R.D. at 595. This Act provides further
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Supreme Court and represents a plethora of technical educational
inquiries outside the expertise of the district courts. However, given
the "meaningful education" standard established in Lau, courts
may have no choice but to assume the role of super-educators by
determining whether school boards are effectively equalizing educational opportunity with respect to non-English speaking students.
As the next two cases depict, however, such a searching standard
of inquiry may not be the only avenue of review left to the courts in
cases of this nature.
4.

Otero v. Mesa County School Board" 4 and Keyes v. School
District No. 1 '

Otero concerned a class action suit brought on behalf of Chicano
students against a Colorado School District. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief which would require the school board to provide acceptable bilingual-bicultural education programs. " ' One unique
aspect of Otero was that the class of students asserting that they
7
had been deprived of a meaningful education was relatively small."
Also, the district court determined that the school board had made
a conscientious effort to recognize and solve any problem which
existed as to any student."8 The court found that the small number
of students and the good faith motivation on the part of the school
board distinguished this case from Lau and Serna."I Therefore, the
school board was insulated from judicial intervention. 2 0 Since the
court declined to review the success of the school board's existing
language program, it concluded that the plaintiffs only wanted to
restructure the curriculum to meet the needs of a small number of
students. Thus, the court determined, plaintiffs were seeking "to
substitute their judgment for the thoughtful, independent judgment
financial assistance to local educational agencies to develop "new and imaginative elementary and secondary school programs designed to meet [the] special educational needs" of
children of "limited English-speaking ability." 20 U.S.C. § 880b (1970).
114. 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975).
115. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975).
116. 408 F. Supp. at 164.
117. Of the 628 students tested by the school board, 18 were found to be Spanish dominant, 5 were found to be bilingual, and 4 were found to be Spanish proficient. Id. at 165. It
cannot be determined from the opinion whether 628 was the total Hispanic population of the
Mesa County School District.
118. Id. at 171.
119. See notes 30-62 & 68-87 and accompanying text supra.
120. 408 F. Supp. at 171.
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of the elected school board."' 2
There were significant practical, as well as legal obstacles, confronting plaintiffs in Otero. One of the principal difficulties was the
dearth of concrete educational and linguistic data which would
show a substantial need for bilingual instruction in the school district. The plaintiffs attempted to rectify this void by presenting
a "home survey" which was intended to ascertain if Spanish was
spoken in the homes of Spanish surnamed students.'22 The district
court dismissed this evidence as having no bearing on the issue of
the extent of the need for bilingual education in the school district.2 3 The court deferred to tests conducted by the school board
which seemed to show no English language problems on the part of
a significant number of Hispanic students." 4 The court then cited
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Lau, and the "substantial
group requirement" in Serna, as authority for the proposition that
a Title VI violation could exist only when a substantial number of
students are being deprived of a meaningful education.' 25 Since the
school board's statistics substantiated that no such need existed,
plaintiff's claim necessarily failed.
In addition to this information vacuum, plaintiffs were also hampered by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Keyes v. School District
No. 11 which was handed down while Otero was being considered.
It is evident from the way the Tenth Circuit decided Keyes, that it
was cognizant of the Otero situation. 7 Unlike Otero, however,
Keyes dealt primarily with the desegregation of the Hispanic
schools in the Denver school system under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Keyes affirmed the district court's
finding that the entire Denver district was an illegal dual school
system, 9 but determined, further, that the lower court's remedial
121. Id. at 164.
122. Id.at 167.
123. Id.at 168.
124. Id.
125. Id.at 171.
126. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975).
127. These two cases were being litigated within the Tenth Circuit at approximately the
same time. The Tenth Circuit wanted to avoid the repetition of future Otero-type cases. This
can be seen by the declaration of a strong policy of deference to local school board decisionmaking in Keyes. See notes 137 & 138 and accompanying text infra.
128. 521 F.2d at 470.
129. Id. at 476. Pursuant to a remand order from the United States Supreme Court, 413
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plans insufficiently met the Constitution's demands. ''0 Conversely,
on the issue of providing bilingual instruction, the Tenth Circuit
retreated and held that the district court had transgressed the limits
of its power by ordering the school board to implement a plan for
the bilingual-bicultural education of minority group children."3 ' The
particular plan rejected was the Cardenas plan, which was also
proposed by plaintiffs in Otero.,I This plan was premised upon the
theory that the poor performance of minority children in public
schools results from "incompatibilities" between the cultural characteristics of minority students and the middle class methods and
expectations of the school system involved. In rejecting plaintiff's
assertion that the fourteenth amendment required the institution of
such a plan, either to achieve meaningful desegregation or equal
educational opportunity, the Tenth Circuit, nevertheless, agreed
with the lower court that a meaningful desegregation program must
include the transition of Spanish-speaking children to the English
language. 33 However, the court concluded that, in this instance, the
lower court's order was improper since it went beyond the mere
attainment of proficiency in the English language and imposed
upon school authorities a pervasive and detailed system for the
134
education of minority children.
The court addressed the Title VI claim and concluded that even
if a violation were supported by the record, the Cardenasplan would
5
overstep the scope of a remedy properly directed to the violation.'
Consequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit vacated the district court's order concerning the implementation of the Cardenas plan and remanded for "a determination of
the relief, if any, necessary to ensure that Hispanic and other minority children will have the opportunity to acquire proficiency in the
U.S. 189 (1973), the district court made this determination. 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1974).
130. 521 F.2d at 480. See also notes 154-156 and accompanying text infra.
131. Id.at 482.
132. Id. at 480. Dr. Jose Cardenas, the prime developer of the plan, is an expert in
curriculum, bilingual, bicultural education. 480 F. Supp. at 165. His plan is directed toward
dealing with the obstacles bilingual children encounter when they are introduced into a school
system which is oriented substantially toward educating middle class Anglo-children. To
resolve these inequities, the Cardenas plan was extended to matters of educational philosophy, government, institutional scope and sequence, curriculum, ongoing student and program
evaluations, and staffing and community involvement. 521 F.2d at 481.
133. 521 F.2d at 482.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 483 n.22.
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English language."' 36
The Keyes court rationalized its nonintervention into this area of
public education by resort to past precedents and public policy
arguments. It noted that direct local control over educational
decision-making has long been thought to be essential both to the
maintenance of community concern and to support for public
schools.' 37 Educational policy-making was viewed as an area in
which the courts' lack of specialized knowledge and experience
counsels against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels.' 38 In addition, the court
accepted, but did not seriously question, the statutory policy of
Colorado to encourage bilingual skills and to assist in the transition
of non-English speaking students to English.' 39 The court also deferred to programs developed by the Denver school authorities to
lend assistance to children who have learning difficulties because
they come from non-English speaking families. 140 In conclusion, the
court perceived these local control policy considerations, as well as
the steps taken by the school board and the state to effectuate
bilingual instruction, as satisfying constitutional and statutory
demands for bilingual education.
This cautious approach was thought to conform with the Supreme
Court's decision in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,'
which held that education is not a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution, except insofar as some minimal quantum is necessary to enable the exercise of free speech and voting.' There had
been no showing that this minimum standard had been violated in
Keyes. Moreover, defendants evinced that some program of bilingual education had been implemented. The Tenth Circuit read
Rodriguez as demanding that courts, under these circumstances,
136. Id. at 483. The "if any" phrase in this order strongly suggests that the reviewing court
did not want the district court to find a violation upon remand.
137. Id. at 482.
138. Id.
139. Id. However, Colorado is still considered to be a permissive state with respect to
bilingual education programs. See GEFFERT & HARPER, supra note 63, at 122. This means that
the state permits the use of a language of instruction other than English, but the school
district is under no duty to provide such programs no matter what the extent of the need
might be. Id. at 124.
140, 521 F.2d at 482.
141. 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
142, Id. at 35-37. However, unlike Keyes, Rodriguez dealt with the constitutionality of
Texas' public school financing system.
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must "scrutinize under judicial principles sensitive to the nature of
the State's efforts. 1 ' 3 Such an expressed policy of deference was

tantamount to urging little or no scrutiny when reviewing these
types of cases. The net effect was that plaintiff's claim in Keyes had
to be rejected as an unwarranted intrusion into local educational
authority.

Given this statement of policy in Keyes, it is no wonder that the
Otero court rejected plaintiff's equal protection argument. In addition to citing the Keyes reasoning, the Otero court rationalized that
if such a constitutional right to bilingual-bicultural education existed "the needs of a single student would give rise to that right, and
our nation's schools would bankrupt themselves in meeting equal
protection claims."' 4 Otero's rejection of plaintiff's equal protection
claim is defensible. This is due to the Supreme Court's avoidance
of the constitutional issue in Lau. Furthermore, unlike Keyes, the
Otero court had found no segregative practices whatsoever on the
part of the school board.
What must be questioned is both the Otero and Keyes courts
cursory rejection of the Title VI claim. Otero based this conclusion
on the sparsity of disadvantaged students, as the school district saw
it, 'and on the supposed good faith efforts of the school board to
correct extant language deficiencies. ' 5 Reading a substantial number requirement into Lau may be permissible given the potential
practical effect of the decision, although neither the majority opinion in Lau, nor Title VI, mention such prerequisite. Yet, in reviewing the adequacy of existing bilingual education programs, good
faith is not germane to the issue of whether Title VI has been violated. This is because discriminatory effect, rather than intent, is
the standard to be applied under the statute.' Also, in determining
whether such discriminatory effect is present, and/or whether a substantial need exists, the courts should be aware of the availability
and use of more sophisticated testing materials and procedures, as
well as the common weaknesses involved in standardized tests and
evaluations conducted by state education agencies. 4 ' Given the po143. 521 F.2d at 483.
144. Such a contention by the court is without merit given the fact that the courts would
probably read a "significant number" requirement into the constitutional right as was done
with the Title VI claim. See notes 190 & 191 and accompanying text infra.
145. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
146. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
147. For an interesting article on questionable educational testing procedures see Note,
The Legal Implications of CulturalBias in the Intelligence Testing of DisadvantagedSchool
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tential for national origin discrimination, it is suggested that the
courts should apply a suspect classification analogy even though a
constitutional right is not involved. If this approach were maintained, then once discriminatory effect is established, the courts
would have to be more than just casually concerned with the programs and testing procedures of the local school boards. This would
compel the courts to review the record with a greater degree of
scrutiny than that espoused by the Otero and Keyes courts. 4 '

V.

THE DESEGREGATION FACTOR

Some bilingual programs have been implemented in the wake of
desegregation decrees.' In addition to the Title VI approach, two
fourteenth amendment theories have been advanced for the implementation or stabilization of bilingual programs within the context
of desegregation.' m One theory is that a constitutional right to bilingual education is shown where such is necessary to achieve a meaningful desegregation. The other fourteenth amendment theory proceeds upon the more independent ground that linguistic minorities
have a constitutional right to an equal educational opportunity.'"
In some situations, however, the rights to desegregation and bilingual education may conflict in theory. Bilingual instruction by its
very nature invariably entails the separation of ethnics in varying
degrees depending upon the extent of the bilingual grouping practices utilized by the school board. Used in a malicious manner,
bilingual instruction could conceivably act as a guise to promote
discrimination and to further the segregation of minorities. This
potential misuse of bilingual education may explain the Supreme
Court's refusal to characterize the right to bilingual education as a
Children, 61 GEO. L.J. 1027, 1028-35 (1972). See also Leary, Children Who Are Tested in an
Alien Language Mentally Retarded? NEW REPUBLIC, May 30, 1970, at 17; Sorgen, Testing and
Tracking in Public Schools, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1129 (1973). In Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe
School Dist. No. 3, Civil No. 71-435 (D. Ariz. 1972), plaintiffs successfully sued on the theory
that I.Q. tests administered in English discriminated against Mexican-American and Indian
children, and the court ordered that future intelligence testing be in both English and Spanish. It is asserted that other testing and evaluation areas are equally suspect given the
cultural, class, and language differences which usually separate the school board from the
students under review.
148. This strict scrutiny analogy will be more fully explored. See notes 203-217 and accompanying text infra.
149. See notes 161-182 and accompanying text infra.
150. 521 F.2d at 481.
1W. Id.
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co-existing constitutional right.'52 The potential collision of the two
constitutional rights, even if both were legitimately in need of exercise, could have presented irreconcilable conflicts, too complex and
meticulous for the courts to handle. Furthermore, the possible invidious use of bilingual education to isolate, rather than to equalize,
minorities for segregation purposes, or its use simply to separate
minorities for instructional purposes, may militate against the general acceptance of bilingual education as a meaningful statutory
right of equal educational opportunity under Title VI.
The confrontation between these two rights was manifest in
Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1. "1Under the district court's order in
Keyes, at least four elementary schools would have remained segregated. This constitutional infirmity was offset by the initiation or
continuation of bilingual-bicultural programs. 5 ' Upon review, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the implementation of the Cardenas
plan could not justify continued segregation of any of these
schools. 5 5 Bilingual education was not viewed as a substitute for
desegregation. 56 The court noted that although bilingual instruction
may be required to prevent isolation of minority students in the
school system, such instruction must be subordinate to a plan of
school desegregation. 7 As the Keyes court perceived it, such a conflict had to be resolved in favor of the right to desegregation. Yet,
this resolution would not have been so easily reached if bilingual
instruction had been established as an equally demanding constitutional right or, in the alternative, as a well-defined statutory right
under Title VI.
The circumstances in Keyes, however, were unique, and a proper
desegregation decree could have avoided the clash of these important educational rights. Race and national origin discrimination
were being extensively practiced by the school board. 5 ' The district
court was faced with the awesome task of resolving these various
152. This conflict of rights may also help explain the court's brevity in defining the Title
VI claim in Lau.
153. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975).
154. Id. at 479-80.
155. Id. at 480.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Plaintiff's evidence established to the district court's satisfaction that the Board's
intentional segregation in the Park Hill schools substantially affected schools throughout the
school system. Therefore, the entire Denver School system had to be desegregated. 368 F.
Supp. 207, 211 (D. Colo. 1971).
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inequities by the least intrusive means. With this end in mind, it
tried to avoid the desegregation of some schools by ordering the
implementation of extensive bilingual education programs. It was
this "balance" that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit refused to approve. 5 ' This disapproval should not
have led to the abandonment of all bilingual instruction programs
ordered by the district court, as the reviewing court concluded.""
Such an all or nothing approach was unwarranted. The reasoning
employed in Keyes ignored the lower court's good faith efforts to
remedy Hispanic language deficiencies which had resulted from
years of segregation and substandard education.
Rights to desegregation and bilingual education are not necessarily on a collision course. On the contrary, in Keyes, it would have
been possible for the two rights to be mutually beneficial. Bilingual
education programs could be used to achieve a meaningful education once students are desegregated. Similarly, the desegregation
claim, given the scope of the constitutional attack, may be the most
effective means of attaining comprehensive, court-ordered, bilingual education programs. Several recent cases exemplify this reciprocal process and the peaceful co-existence of the rights involved.
As part of an overall remedy in a Texas desegregation case,"' the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ordered the inclusion of bilingual-bicultural programs to assist the
Mexican-American students in adjusting to their new school environment.1 2 In this instance, unlike Keyes, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's intrusion into the linguistic policies of the schools. This was justified as necessary to
assure minority students a meaningful desegregation.6 3 On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit envisioned no problems arising from the combination of desegregation and bilingual education remedies. The court
admirably avoided adopting the view that these rights were diametrically opposed, as the Tenth Circuit had done in Keyes."'4
159. 521 F.2d at 480.
160. Id. at 483. Although the court remanded for a renewed determination of the need for
bilingual education in the Denver school system, the "if any" language employed by the court
made it an order without meaning. See note 136 and accompanying text supra.
161. United States v. State of Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
162. Id. at 27-28.
163. Affirmed per curiam, 446 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1972). There is no doubt that the extent
of the remedy mandated in the Texas case was not as broad as the remedy ordered by the
district court in Keyes. Yet, United States v. State of Texas at least demonstrates that courts
can find comfortable half-way grounds in mixed bilingual desegregation cases.
164. See text accompanying and following notes 153-160 supra.
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In Morgan v. Kerrigan,65- a Massachusetts desegregation case involving black parents and their children, the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts was confronted with the
problem of the interplay between bilingual education and integration. This court perceived no problem with respect to the objectives
that each right represented. After finding the schools to be unconstitutionally segregated, the district court ordered a desegregation
plan that also provided for bilingual instruction.' 6 The plan's assignment guidelines took into account "other minority" students in
a manner that went beyond simply aggregating them with black
students during the process of developing school composition limits. " 7 The plaintiff-intervenors, representing Spanish-speaking students and their parents, stressed the right to adequate bilingual
education, and requested the implementation of bilingual schooling
for Hispanic students and others in need of this service.' The court
determined that in order to minimize their excessive dispersal, bilingual students should be given a preference by assigning them to
schools ahead of other groups.' 9 The court felt that this would permit the "clustering" of bilingual classes, thus enabling Boston's
schools to fulfill the promise of Massachusetts' exemplary bilingual
education law,' 70 as well as the requirements of Title VI. 17' Morgan
indicates that, even within the context of desegregation, courts can
effectively enforce stringent statutory requirements of bilingual instruction without interfering with the goals of desegregation.
In a post-Lau Texas desegregation case,' involving the Austin
Independent School District (AISD), the Fifth Circuit again perceived no conflict between desegregation and the institution of a
bilingual education program. The district court adopted a commitment by the superintendent of schools that the AISD had an ongoing bilingual-bicultural education program that would continue
"regardless of the level of federal funding.''' 7 3 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the inclusion of this
165. 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975).
166. Id. at 242.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Massachusetts is the forerunner state in legislatively mandating bilingual education
for its citizens in need of such service. See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
171. 401 F. Supp. at 242.
172. United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976).
173. Id. at 398.
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commitment as part of the decree by asserting that "state and federal law requires as much.""' Again, as in the pre-Lau Texas desegregation case, 7 5 no mention was made of the conflict between mandatory bilingual education laws and the remedial orders of the court
concerning the imposition of a desegregation plan.
Finally, in Evans v. Buchanon, "I representatives of the Hispanic
community in Wilmington, Delaware were allowed to intervene in
order to protect existing bilingual programs from any desegregation
plan which the court might order. "7 While the United States District Court for the District of Delaware did not determine whether
members of the Hispanic population had been victims of any discriminatory activity on the part of the school district,7 , it found that
segregation in the school system did exist.7 9 The court believed
consolidation of city and suburban schools was necessary to vitiate
this harm.8 0 Unlike Keyes, however, the new or interim boards for
these newly structured school districts were charged with ensuring
that during the implementation of the desegregation plan, those
students in need of bilingual instruction would be placed in schools
in sufficient numbers to allow the programs to continue.'' These
new boards were also responsible for ensuring that the programs
would not be reduced or cut back with respect to those students
presently enrolled. 8 2 As was done in Morgan v. Kerrigan, this court
saw little difficulty in grouping bilingual minorities in the context
of desegregation so as to effectuate their rights to bilingual education.
In contrast to the conflict-oriented approach adopted in Keyes,
most courts view desegregation orders as threats to the legal rights
of bilingual minority students. Consequently, the courts have taken
the general steps necessary to preserve or implement bilingual education programs to augment desegregation schemes. It is asserted
174. Id. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (Supp. V 1975); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.451 (Vernon
Supp. 1975).
175. United States v. State of Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971). See notes 161 &
162 and accompanying text supra.
176. 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976).
177. Id. at 359. Cf. Armstrong v. O'Connell, 74 F.R.D. 429 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (plaintiffs'
motion to intervene was denied).
178. 416 F. Supp. at 359-60.
179. Id. at 334.
180. Id. at 348-52.
181. Id. at 360.
182. Id.
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that this general inclination would persist even if bilingual education were established as a constitutional right or as a definitive
statutory right under Title VI.
V.

CONCLUSIONAL ANALYSIS

As the review of the above cases depicts, the bilingual education
area is in a state of flux. Some courts have actively pursued the
correction of linguistic imbalances, while others have refused to
intervene. The reason for this uncertainty and confusion lies in the
fact that Lau left many questions unanswered with respect to the
determination of liability and remedy. The Supreme Court's statutory, as opposed to constitutional, approach in Lau, diminished the
impact of the decision. Consequently, judicial division over the legal
status of bilingual education persists in the post-Lau era, just as it
existed before Lau was decided.
The judicial disagreement is manifest within the Tenth Circuit by
that court's acceptance of the Serna plan, but rejection of the Keyes
plan. The Otero court tried to justify this disparity by citing the
unique circumstances in Serna. 3 This, however, was an unsatisfactory distinction, which was unconvincingly used to explain the contrary results. Achievement scores and IQ tests were used by both
district courts to determine the existence of unequal educational
opportunity." 4 Inferiority and alienation of Chicano students that
resulted from superficially "equal" education was interpreted by
both lower courts to have been a violation of the equal protection
clause.8 5 Yet, how the Tenth Circuit could affirm the far-reaching
court plan in Serna," but conclude, in Keyes, that the entire program constituted an unwarranted and improper judicial interference in the internal affairs of the school district'87 is an inconsistency
without a satisfactory explanation. Perhaps the underlying reason
was not the unique circumstances in Serna, but rather the unique
circumstances in Keyes, which, unlike Serna, dealt with the large
183. 408 F. Supp. at 171.
184. Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d at 1149-50. The use of such tests can be
presumed in Keyes because, although not specifically mentioned by the court, evidence of
this nature had to be produced by plaintiffs in order to justify the implementation of the
Cardenas plan.
185. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673, 695 (D. Colo. 1974); Serna v. Portales
Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d at 1150.
186. 499 F.2d at 1151-52.
187. 521 F.2d at 481.
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metropolitan school district of Denver. The Tenth Circuit simply
retreated from its broad brush approach in Serna in order to avoid
implementing the extensive remedial powers of the court without
clear proof that a violation had been perpetrated. A more stringent
burden of proof was required of the plaintiffs in Keyes, in comparison to Serna, even though the school board had been found guilty
of practicing de jure segregation against Chicano students based on
race and national origin discrimination.'
These facts may help to explain the disparity between Serna and
Keyes but, of course, fail to justify the conflicting approaches that
have been adopted by the various circuits. The active roles played
by the courts in Serna, Rios, and Aspira, in contrast to the deferential approaches taken in Keyes and Otero, indicate that there are
still major disagreements as to how the rights of bilingual education
are to be managed. Because such uncertainty can only contribute
to the continued erosion of the rights of bilingual minority students,
a modification of the present status of the law is necesary to insure
the wholesale dissolution of policies of linguistic exclusion within
the public school systems of the United States.
If bilingual education were made a constitutional right under the
fourteenth amendment, then much of the confusion, represented by
the case law previously reviewed, could be eliminated.' Theoretically, under such a constitutional scheme, the existence of a single
non-English speaking child within a school district would require
the implementation of a comprehensive bilingual program of instruction. This might foster judicial certainty; however, as alluded
to in Otero, such a state of the law could possibly lead to the bankruptcy of the public schools."10
This financial threat, which might result from the constitutionalization of bilingual education, may be academic, however, if the
courts read a "significant number" requirement into the constitutional right, as was done with the statutory right. It may still be
problematic, however, for courts to convert this statutory right into
a constitutional right. This is due to the Supreme Court's recent
188. About 25% of the children attending public schools in the Denver school system were
Spanish surnamed. This is quite a sizeable minority to be affected by de jure segregation.
380 F. Supp. at 674-75 (D. Colo. 1974). See note 158 and accompanying text supra.
189. For an interesting article which argues for the constitutionalization of bilingual education, see, The ConstitutionalRight of Bilingual Children, supra note 12.
190. See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
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decision in Washington v. Davis,'' a government employment discrimination case, which held that discriminatory effect without discriminatory purpose is not sufficient to trigger a strict scrutiny standard of review under the equal protection clause."' When this standard is applied, as opposed to a rational basis test,' 3 the burden of
justification is on the state and the validity of the state action is no
longer presumed. 9 ' Washington v. Davis stands for the proposition
that a court may not apply such a strict scrutiny standard, in an
equal protection case involving allegations of discrimination, until
it determines that the violation was due to a purposeful design."' '
This intent-oriented standard, unlike the "effect" test used in the
statutory scheme,' would make the constitutional violation more
difficult to establish. Thus, the Title VI action would become increasingly more important in the bilingual education area. However, the drawback with regard to the maintenance of the statutory
approach is that statutory rights, unlike their constitutional counterparts, can easily be eliminated either by repealing legislation or
by modifications in the regulations drafted pursuant to the statutory authorization.
It may be assumed that the creation of a constitutional right to
bilingual education will not be forthcoming. However, it is vitally
important that the Title VI claim be enhanced in a fashion that will
preclude lower courts from acquiescing in "smokescreen programs."'9 7 Token programs of this kind were sufficient in Otero and
Keyes to prompt judicial deference to school board policies. This
191. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977), wherein the Court discussed the kinds of evidence it would consider
probative of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 264-68. Even if discriminatory purpose were
shown, strict scrutiny would not be automatically applied, but would simply shift to the
defendant "the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had
the impermissible purpose not been considered." Id. at 270 n.21.
192. 426 U.S. at 238-48.
193. See note 199 and accompanying text infra.
194. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967).
195. See note 191 and accompanying text supra.
196. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
197. Smokescreen programs are basically ineffective programs of bilingual instruction
which school boards implement to discourage court intervention. Such programs can be worse
than no program at all since they create the appearance that something is being done to
breach the language barrier when, in fact, money is being spent with no consequent improvement in the educational status of the bilingual child. Due to the acceptance of such programs,
courts which follow the Otero and Keyes approaches can ignore legitimate rights to bilingual
education as long as a school district shows that some kind of effort, however ineffective, is
being expended to assuage linguistic difficulties.
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occurred in Keyes even though the court found rampant discrimination and segregation of Chicanos in the Denver school system.'"
Actually, Keyes and Otero utilized a restrained standard of review
which was, in effect, a rational basis test being applied within the
statutory context.'"9 As a result, the courts which choose to follow
this route will not interfere in the policies of the school districts
unless the state action under review is "palpably arbitrary."20 0 Most
school districts, however, would not be so injudicious to act in such
a capricious manner. Under this approach, as long as some program
is provided, judicial inquiry will be forestalled.
In Serna, the Tenth Circuit chose to make a constitutional analogy with respect to the remedy of the Title VI violation by citing
the "spirit of Swann" as justification for the extensive remedy.,"
This rationale is ill-chosen and, if misinterpreted, could lead to
significant problems, similar to those financial and enforcement
problems which District Judge Winner wanted to avoid by his rejection of the constitutional approach in Otero.202 However, if the constitutional analogy is made with regard to the determination of
school board liability, rather then remedy, then the "significant
number" requirement, which has been read into the Title VI claim,
would continue to alleviate fears of school system bankruptcy. Besides solving these financial and enforcement problems, a constitutional analogy to liability, rather than remedy, would encourage a
court to intervene, regardless of its philosophical inclinations, to
protect the rights of bilingual minority students.
Title VI prohibits the effects of discrimination "on the ground of
race, color or national origin."20 Coincidentally, these factors are
considered to be suspect classifications within the constitutional
area.204 In a constitutional analysis, once it is established that one
or more of these classes has been the object of intentional discrimination, then a strict scrutiny standard of review is applied to the
state action under consideration. 025 Such a standard of review
198. See note 188 and accompanying text supra.
199. For a good discussion of the use of rational basis in the constitutional area, see The
ConstitutionalRight of Bilingual Children, supra note 12, at 959.
200. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
201. See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
202. See note 144 and accompanying text supra.
203. See note 128 and accompanying text supra.
204. Developments in the Law-EqualProtection,82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1087-131 (1969).
205. Id.
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usually results in the invalidation of the state action.206 It is suggested that this same approach should be utilized when the courts
are determining whether there has been a Title VI violation. This
approach is especially convenient since these suspect classifications
are specifically enumerated in the statute. If this approach were
adopted, then the only difference between the statutory and constitutional approaches would be that in the latter approach
"purposeful design" or intentional discrimination on the part of the
20 7
state agency must be proven in order to activate strict scrutiny.
In the Title VI action only the effects of discrimination need to be
shown. In either case, once plaintiff has met his burden, the burden
shifts to the state to demonstrate not only that the classification
rationally implements a permissible purpose, but that the classification is necessary to implement that purpose.20 If a less intrusive
means of implementing that purpose is available, then that method
must be used by the state.01 If a strict scrutiny standard were applied within the statutory context, the courts could not blindly defer
to token programs, or to self-supporting test results and evaluations 210 offered by the school board as proof that the school system
was providing effective, meaningful education to linguistic minority
students.
The attractiveness of this approach may be illustrated as follows.
In Otero, if plaintiff had successfully shown that Chicano students
had low I.Q. scores, a high drop-out rate, low academic achievement, and a low passing rate in comparison to white students, such
data would have been sufficient to prove that the effects of national
origin discrimination were prevalent within the school system.2 1,
Since the effects of national origin discrimination would have been
prima facie demonstrated by this data, then under the strict scrutiny standard of review, applied to a Title VI claim, the burden
206. See The Constitutional Right of Bilingual Children, supra note 12, at 962.
207. It is suggested that Washington v. Davis, discussed at notes 191-195 and accompanying text supra, is not controlling in this statutory setting. See notes 215 & 216 and accompanying text infra.
208. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
209. Id.
210. It is asserted that such tests and evaluations are usually self-supporting given the
fact that the educational agency, and not some independent body, selects and administers
the tests to determine whether it has done a good job in educating bilingual minority students. Such self-serving evidence should be reviewed under close judicial inquiry in cases of
this nature.
211. Such data was sufficient in Serna to lead to this conclusion on the part of the court.
See note 184 and accompanying text supra.
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would have shifted to the school board to show that such effects
were due to socio-economic factors rather than school board policy
or, in the alternative, that existing programs of instruction were
effectively satisfying the needs of linguistic minority students."'2
During the review of defendant's evidence, strict scrutiny would be
employed by the court to determine whether smokescreen programs,
evaluations or self-serving test results were used by the school board
as superficial justification for the state action involved. If this type
of questionable evidence were utilized, the court would be compelled to order the appropriate relief necessary to correct the discriminatory effects due to the linguistic imbalances in the school
district so as to conform with the demands of Title VI. If "significant
number" had not been at issue in Otero,2" then given the above
scenario, the court would have been forced to intervene and order
the implementation of effective bilingual education programs
within the Mesa County Valley School District.
This analogy to the constitutional area, if not restricted solely to
Title VI, would only be applicable to those civil rights statutes
passed pursuant to the authorization in the fourteenth amendment
that "Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." ' This would assure symmetry
in approach to constitutional, as well as statutory, rights of equal
protection; however, total symmetry would be neither possible nor
desirable. The constitution establishes minimum standards of equal
protection, leaving the courts enough leeway to demand a difficult
burden of proof as a prerequisite to the application of a strict scrutiny standard.115 Yet Congress has chosen to go beyond this minimum constitutional standard and has made it a statutory violation
for a school board's actions or omissions to have a discriminating
effect. 16 Therefore, the courts could apply a strict scrutiny standard
of review in the statutory context and avoid the intent-oriented
constitutional burdens of proof which may be almost impossible to
212. This burden can be met by introducing test results, program evaluations, and expert
testimony.
213. See note 117 and accompanying text supra. However, under this strict scrutiny
approach even school board data which indicated an insignificant number of bilingual chil-

dren would be closely scrutinized once it was shown that the effects of discrimination were
being practiced by the school vis i vis linguistic minority students within the school system.
214.

U.S. CONT. amend.

XIV, §

5.

215. See note 191 and accompanying text supra.
216. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
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overcome or define in the bilingual area. 211

A more searching standard of review is necessary to circumvent
the spectre of the Otero and Keyes approaches. If other courts utilized the rationales employed in Otero and Keyes, the Title VI claim
would be as meaningless as if no statutory right to bilingual education had been established."t 8 Moreover, correcting injustices with
respect to the education of linguistic minority students is a "remedy
easily defined and widely recommended by the experts. ' ' 219 In con-

trast to the equal protection area of desegregation, the remedy that
would flow from the application of a strict scrutiny test, to determine whether the statutory right to bilingual education had been
violated, would be relatively simple to implement. Bilingual education decrees would not entail the difficult judgments involved in
desegregation decrees. There would be no need for courts to redraw
lines for school attendance zones or to order busing in order to
achieve racial balance. Additionally, improvements in the status of
bilingual minority students as a result of court-ordered bilingual
education programs could be quantified and measured by proper
linguistic testing procedures. In contrast, it is almost impossible, for
example, to determine whether the efforts of the courts in the desegregation area, in fact, decrease feelings of inferiority on the part of
the minorities or equalize their educational opportunity. If this
more searching standard of review were adopted to eliminate "root
and branch" policies of linguistic exclusion from the public school
system in the United States, then valuable minds would not be
wasted due to language barriers, which, as is now the case, may or
may not be overcome because of the particular philosophical persuasion of the court involved.
ANTHoNY
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217. See note 191 and accompanying text supra.
218. Why have a meaningful education standard if courts are going to defer to what the
school board construes as "meaningful" in the bilingual education area?
219. Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier; The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARv.
C.R.-C.L.L. Rv. 52, 93 (1974).

